US History

On the ‘Multi-Issue’ Approach in Anti-Vietnam War Movement



By Yvonne Hayes

Reader Mark Satinoff recently posted the following comment under the review of Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the Movement in the U.S. to End the Vietnam War:

In the section “Antiwar or multi-issue organizations?” the author states:

The ultralefts also bristled at the movement’s “narrow” focus. They argued in favor of a multi-issue approach, combining opposition to the war with fighting racism, supporting women’s rights, and, in the case of some, advocating an end to imperialism…

Following that Halstead is quoted:

“The inevitable logic of a multi-issue umbrella,” he argues, “would have to be a coalition of radical-liberal forces subordinated to the multi-issue program of the liberal politicians, to a wing of the Democratic Party. In Marxist terminology, a ‘popular front’.”


DISCUSSION WITH OUR READERS


I do not know what historic examples Halstead had in mind when he made that assertion. What I do know is that Halstead was acutely aware of the class forces in play as opposition to the war in Vietnam deepened and the movement against the war broadened. And the forces opposing the war were heavily weighted toward the liberal wing of the movement.

Halstead did not argue that a multi-issue united front was not possible, but that — given the class composition of the movement at the time — any multi-issue program acceptable to most organizations and individuals involved would be a liberal-reformist one. It would turn the movement toward the Democratic Party, in coalition with and, most importantly, subordinate to the liberal wing of the capitalist class.

Halstead described how during each election cycle, even with a solid core of the movement fighting for a clear focus on the war, the impetus toward organizing demonstrations was dulled as antiwar groups and activists were drawn toward campaigning for “peace” candidates.

Immediately following the Halstead quote cited in Mark Satinoff’s comment, the review references a 1965 article by Halstead. In that article, Halstead pointed out, “There is no disagreement that a multi-issue program is necessary for basic social change in this country. All the radical groups have multi-issue programs. The disagreements are over what the program should be, and these disagreements are not going to be resolved easily or quickly.

“The one thing all the tendencies and the independents have in common is opposition to the war in Vietnam. That’s why the independent antiwar committees should be centered around that issue. To attempt to work out a broad multi-issue program for these committees would mean reproducing within them the disputes among the tendencies and would tend to split and narrow them.”

Vietnam veteran tosses medal onto the Capitol steps in Washington, D.C., April 23, 1971. Halstead describes watching 600 veterans file by that day, calling out names of buddies killed in action and flinging medals for fighting in Vietnam. Broadening the antiwar movement to involve working people, including those in uniform, was at the heart of Halstead’s insistence on focusing on the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. (Photo: Fred McDarrah / Getty Images)

The multi-issue approach advanced by liberal forces was also pushed by some radicals. In an April 12, 1969, editorial, the radical weekly The Guardian argued, “Being against the war is not enough. The newly radicalized antiwar movement must struggle against the source of imperialistic war and it must conduct that struggle here and now against the capitalist system, its institutions, politicians and policemen which make such wars inevitable. The movement, simply, must struggle for power to the people.”

The dangers of this “multi-issue” approach were taken up in a 1969 resolution by the Socialist Workers Party, the political organization of which Halstead was a member and leader.

“A variant of the class-collaborationist approach in the antiwar movement has been the line of ‘multi-issue’ organizing,” the resolution[1] said. “Reformists of all stripes have advocated that the antiwar forces unite around a general political program in contrast to the single issue of joint action against the war. Given the class composition, political line, and heterogeneity of the groups involved in the antiwar movement, such a multi-issue program could only be a liberal-reformist one. It would function as a bridge to class-collaborationist electoral politics and divert concentration upon demonstrations against the war.

“As a result of the growing youth radicalization this argument has been updated with left verbiage about transforming the antiwar movement with its mass actions into a general anti-imperialist movement. But such a coalition, ostensibly organized to fight against imperialism in general, would be a fraud. That task requires a revolutionary-socialist party and program to lead the struggle for the socialist revolution. The antiwar movement is anti-imperialist in its actions, not in the program of all its participants. The real function of this multi-issue line would be to build a verbally radical but nonetheless reformist organization as a substitute for organizing mass demonstrations against the war.”

As Halstead pointed out in his 1965 article, “All the radical and pacifist groups look upon the new antiwar movement as an opportunity for meeting new people, discussing particular ideas, and for deepening the general social consciousness of masses of people — and that’s perfectly proper. But that doesn’t mean the antiwar committees should be committed to the particular political program of any tendency.”

Halstead was convinced that the “single-issue” approach — a united front against the war — had the potential to draw in layers of the working class, radicalizing youth, and GIs and to corral the liberals into a coalition, even sometimes against their will. Under this banner, he noted, the antiwar movement was anti-imperialist in its actions, if not in the program of all its participants.

This is precisely what happened. Successive united front formations, centered on the demand for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, mobilized millions, eventually drawing in some labor organizations and inspiring a massive organizing effort among antiwar GIs.

This “single-issue” movement helped the Vietnamese people bring U.S. imperialism to its knees.


NOTES

[1] See Revolutionary Strategy in the Fight Against the Vietnam War, an Education for Socialists bulletin, item 6, page 32.


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  1. What were you left with when that single issue disappeared? Halstead says it would have been difficult to thrash out the politics of a genuinely revolutionary party. Much easier to just throw up a temporary liberal coalition that vanishes when the issue dies down. This article shows how corrupt SWP was, trying to build action-oriented events while hiding its politics.

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