By Yvonne Hayes
Reader Mark Satinoff recently posted the following comment under the review of Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the Movement in the U.S. to End the Vietnam War:
In the section “Antiwar or multi-issue organizations?” the author states:
The ultralefts also bristled at the movement’s “narrow” focus. They argued in favor of a multi-issue approach, combining opposition to the war with fighting racism, supporting women’s rights, and, in the case of some, advocating an end to imperialism…
Following that Halstead is quoted:
“The inevitable logic of a multi-issue umbrella,” he argues, “would have to be a coalition of radical-liberal forces subordinated to the multi-issue program of the liberal politicians, to a wing of the Democratic Party. In Marxist terminology, a ‘popular front’.”
Either I don’t understand the point Halstead is making or I don’t agree with it. Why is it “inevitable” that a multi-issue approach would lead to a ‘popular front?’ Is it preordained? Some examples would be helpful (at least for this reader).
DISCUSSION WITH OUR READERS
I do not know what historic examples Halstead had in mind when he made that assertion. What I do know is that Halstead was acutely aware of the class forces in play as opposition to the war in Vietnam deepened and the movement against the war broadened. And the forces opposing the war were heavily weighted toward the liberal wing of the movement.
Halstead did not argue that a multi-issue united front was not possible, but that — given the class composition of the movement at the time — any multi-issue program acceptable to most organizations and individuals involved would be a liberal-reformist one. It would turn the movement toward the Democratic Party, in coalition with and, most importantly, subordinate to the liberal wing of the capitalist class.
Halstead described how during each election cycle, even with a solid core of the movement fighting for a clear focus on the war, the impetus toward organizing demonstrations was dulled as antiwar groups and activists were drawn toward campaigning for “peace” candidates.
Immediately following the Halstead quote cited in Mark Satinoff’s comment, the review references a 1965 article by Halstead. In that article, Halstead pointed out, “There is no disagreement that a multi-issue program is necessary for basic social change in this country. All the radical groups have multi-issue programs. The disagreements are over what the program should be, and these disagreements are not going to be resolved easily or quickly.
“The one thing all the tendencies and the independents have in common is opposition to the war in Vietnam. That’s why the independent antiwar committees should be centered around that issue. To attempt to work out a broad multi-issue program for these committees would mean reproducing within them the disputes among the tendencies and would tend to split and narrow them.”
The multi-issue approach advanced by liberal forces was also pushed by some radicals. In an April 12, 1969, editorial, the radical weekly The Guardian argued, “Being against the war is not enough. The newly radicalized antiwar movement must struggle against the source of imperialistic war and it must conduct that struggle here and now against the capitalist system, its institutions, politicians and policemen which make such wars inevitable. The movement, simply, must struggle for power to the people.”
The dangers of this “multi-issue” approach were taken up in a 1969 resolution by the Socialist Workers Party, the political organization of which Halstead was a member and leader.
“A variant of the class-collaborationist approach in the antiwar movement has been the line of ‘multi-issue’ organizing,” the resolution[1] said. “Reformists of all stripes have advocated that the antiwar forces unite around a general political program in contrast to the single issue of joint action against the war. Given the class composition, political line, and heterogeneity of the groups involved in the antiwar movement, such a multi-issue program could only be a liberal-reformist one. It would function as a bridge to class-collaborationist electoral politics and divert concentration upon demonstrations against the war.
“As a result of the growing youth radicalization this argument has been updated with left verbiage about transforming the antiwar movement with its mass actions into a general anti-imperialist movement. But such a coalition, ostensibly organized to fight against imperialism in general, would be a fraud. That task requires a revolutionary-socialist party and program to lead the struggle for the socialist revolution. The antiwar movement is anti-imperialist in its actions, not in the program of all its participants. The real function of this multi-issue line would be to build a verbally radical but nonetheless reformist organization as a substitute for organizing mass demonstrations against the war.”
As Halstead pointed out in his 1965 article, “All the radical and pacifist groups look upon the new antiwar movement as an opportunity for meeting new people, discussing particular ideas, and for deepening the general social consciousness of masses of people — and that’s perfectly proper. But that doesn’t mean the antiwar committees should be committed to the particular political program of any tendency.”
Halstead was convinced that the “single-issue” approach — a united front against the war — had the potential to draw in layers of the working class, radicalizing youth, and GIs and to corral the liberals into a coalition, even sometimes against their will. Under this banner, he noted, the antiwar movement was anti-imperialist in its actions, if not in the program of all its participants.
This is precisely what happened. Successive united front formations, centered on the demand for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, mobilized millions, eventually drawing in some labor organizations and inspiring a massive organizing effort among antiwar GIs.
This “single-issue” movement helped the Vietnamese people bring U.S. imperialism to its knees.
NOTES
[1] See Revolutionary Strategy in the Fight Against the Vietnam War, an Education for Socialists bulletin, item 6, page 32.
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Categories: Discussion with Readers, US History
What were you left with when that single issue disappeared? Halstead says it would have been difficult to thrash out the politics of a genuinely revolutionary party. Much easier to just throw up a temporary liberal coalition that vanishes when the issue dies down. This article shows how corrupt SWP was, trying to build action-oriented events while hiding its politics.
When did the SWP hide it’s politics during that time? Many opponents complained that the SWP was too aggressive in sharing our program.
When the “single issue” of getting U.S. troops out of Vietnam “disappeared,” as Haven Peters puts it, youth of this author’s generation, the U.S. working class, and its allies were left with an end to an imperialist war that had killed 60,000 of our friends, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters, and fathers and mothers. Even more importantly, the Vietnamese people were left free of continued bombardment and the scorching of their landscape, not to mention having won the sovereign right to reunify their country free of colonial domination.
This “single issue,” mass antiwar movement helped the Vietnamese people bring U.S. imperialism to its knees and handed Washington its first major military defeat. As David McReynolds, chairman of the War Resistors’ League International, aptly put it in a tribute to Halstead’s life, “Because of Fred Halstead, the Vietnam War ended sooner. There are Vietnamese children alive today because of his work, just as there are working-class Americans who got home earlier — or were not drafted at all — because of his work.”
Seeking to build a movement based on agreement solely on the need to end the war helped make this possible.
The implication that Halstead advocated this approach as an alternative to building a revolutionary socialist party in the United States is utterly false. He saw no contradiction between doing both.
Haven Peters’ assertion that the SWP hid its politics during the anti-Vietnam war movement also flies in the face of the facts.
I share Willa Madden’s view that the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) never hid its program or politics. Neither did Halstead.
Halstead, a leader of the SWP, was completely transparent about his ideas during the entire period. He openly ran for U.S. president in 1968 on the SWP ticket, based on a program that went far beyond opposition to the Vietnam War. As a result, the organization itself recruited hundreds of young people who had become convinced through their antiwar activity that the problem of Vietnam was symptomatic of the much deeper problem of capitalist rule.
What Halstead never did, however, was insist that any of the individuals and tendencies he worked with in the antiwar movement adopt the views of his party beyond those specific strategies and tactics necessary to getting the U.S. military out of Vietnam.
Haven Peters’ other assertion that “Halstead says it would have been difficult to thrash out the politics of a genuinely revolutionary party” is made of whole cloth as well. Halstead was part of a political party and an international movement that had thrashed out such a political program and was in the process of building a genuine revolutionary socialist party.
This is what Halstead did say, as the article above, points out: “There is no disagreement that a multi-issue program is necessary for basic social change in this country. All the radical groups have multi-issue programs. The disagreements are over what the program should be, and these disagreements are not going to be resolved easily or quickly.”
That’s why it was necessary to build a united front in the antiwar movement around “the one thing all the tendencies and the independents have in common [which] is opposition to the war in Vietnam.” That strategy proved successful, as history unambiguously shows.
– Yvonne Hayes