The following is an article on the upcoming national elections in Brazil, scheduled for October 4, 2026. The author, Ernesto Limia, published the Spanish-language version of this article in Al Mayadeen, a satellite news channel based in Beirut, Lebanon, and submitted the English-language version to World-Outlook for publication.
Ernesto Limia is a historian, writer, member of the National Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba (known as UNEAC, its Spanish-language acronym), and director of the TV program MARCAS. He is also the author of the bilingual book Patria y cultura en Revolución (Homeland and Culture in Revolution). Over the last year, World-Outlook has published two interviews with him about the situation facing Cuba.
We are publishing the article below for the information of our readers. The headline, subhead, text, and bibliography that follow are from the Spanish-language original. The author provided the English-language translation to World-Outlook, which did light editing to improve readability. Notes and most photos are by World-Outlook.
— World-Outlook editors
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Brazil Heading to October 4, 2026: Analysis of the Electoral Landscape
Flávio Bolsonaro hammered out sanctions with Marco Rubio in Washington and promised to make a transition team available to the United States if he is elected.
By Ernesto Limia
September 17, 2026
Elections will be held in Brazil on October 4 against a backdrop of the Latin American oligarchy aligning itself with the United States — a development closely tied to Trump’s interference in the elections held during his second term. This is not a new practice in Washington; what is different is the brazenness with which it is now declared. Trump has already announced his preference for Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of Jair Bolsonaro, who is running as the candidate of the Liberal Party (PL).
Brazil is one of the world’s ten largest economies, with the second-largest reserves — behind China — of rare earth minerals on the planet and a major supplier to the United States. Paradoxically, it is marked by one of the highest income concentrations on the planet and structural inequality that today is reflected in the fact that 12.9 million people there live in extreme poverty. Will Trump achieve his goals?
Jair Bolsonaro and the 2023 coup attempt
Jair Bolsonaro took office as president of Brazil in 2019, and his regime became a parody of Nazism. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated him in 2022 by a narrow margin: 50.83 percent to 49.17 percent.
Lula swore allegiance to the Constitution for the third time on January 1, 2023, and on the 8th, a mob vandalized Congress, the Planalto Palace, and the Federal Supreme Court (STF), driven by digital operators who created the perception of an “inevitable victory.”[1]
Legal proceedings against Bolsonaro[2] concluded with a 27-year prison sentence in 2025. He leads the neo-fascist and far-right movement, but since he is in prison and barred from holding office until 2030, he “anointed” his son Flávio — a senator since 2019 — as his candidate. Although Flávio was designated by his father as his political heir, he did not generate unanimous enthusiasm, not even within the PL.
Brazil’s economic performance over the past four years
Gross Domestic Product grew by 3.2 percent in 2023 and 3.4 percent in 2024; however, an unstable global context combined with Trump’s tariffs caused growth to drop to 2.3 percent in 2025. For 2026, the Central Bank projected growth of 1.5 percent.
Redistributive policies, combined with the expansion of social programs, lifted 14.17 million people out of poverty, and in 2025, Brazil was removed from the Hunger Map. Unemployment fell to historic lows (5.6% – 6.2%), and since 2026, the income tax exemption for those earning up to 5,000 reais per month ($975.50 US) has benefited 15 million people.
The country experienced progress in social mobility and growth in the average household income: 5.8 million people moved into the middle class, and 6.4 million rose out of extreme poverty. Nevertheless, the government’s approval rating hovered around 24 percent in 2025 — an unprecedented disconnect. What accounts for this?
More than half the population does not feel the impact of macroeconomic indicators in their wallets. It proved impossible for Lula to reindustrialize the country with a Congress that represents the interests of agribusiness and financial capital, and which controls 25 percent of non-discretionary spending through earmarked budget appropriations. Consequently, the improvements are not structural, and their sustainability is viewed with skepticism.
A statistic: As of March 2026, 8.9 million companies had overdue debt totaling 213 billion reais ($41,556.3 million). Most are small businesses that account for 30 percent of Latin America’s largest economy. This creates pressure on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), neighborhood stores, and cafés to stay in business, as they must cope with the cost of loan terms hovering near a two-decade high, amid increasingly scarce credit and inflation at 5 percent.
Another weak point is security: 29 percent of Brazilians cite it as a serious problem that the government is unable to solve, and although in 2026 Lula launched the Anti-Gang Law and the “Brazil Against Organized Crime” program, these measures are seen as a belated response.
Trump’s interference in Brazil’s internal affairs
In July 2025, Trump imposed a 50 percent tariff on imports from Brazil — food, footwear, textiles, furniture, and auto parts; and using the Magnitsky Act (which punishes foreigners for serious human rights violations and corrupt practices), he sanctioned STF Justice Alexandre de Moraes — in both cases as explicit retaliation for Bolsonaro’s trial.
Lula defied Trump with a speech centered on sovereignty and saw his popularity in Brazil rebound from 24 percent in 2025 to between 44 and 48 percent in early 2026. Dozens of meetings between officials from both governments and the US Supreme Court ruling that placed limits on Trump’s tariffs dismantled the initial plan; but on July 21, 2026, Trump surprised everyone with tariffs ranging from 12.5 to 37.5 percent, causing exports to the United States to plummet to their lowest level since 1997.
Flávio Bolsonaro hammered out the sanctions in Washington with US secretary of state Marco Rubio and promised to put a transition team at the disposal of the United States if he is elected. Two days after the tariffs were enacted, Rubio “sanctified” him in a public letter and shortly thereafter declared that Brazil is not a friend of the United States — an unprecedented statement directed at the South American giant.
Faria Lima (the financial center in São Paulo) and the Centrão — the majority bloc in Congress made up of legislators so corrupt that they side with the highest bidder — had initially favored the governor of São Paulo; however, after these signals, they aligned themselves with Flávio.[3]
Lula responded on July 26 in The Washington Post. I’ll highlight a few points:
“Latin America and the Caribbean do not need aircraft carriers patrolling their waters or punitive tariffs”;
“Dividing the world into spheres of influence and seeking out neocolonial enterprises to obtain strategic resources are anachronistic gestures and steps backward”;
“Attempts to impose ideological restrictions on the bilateral partnership, or to exploit it for electoral purposes, will not be tolerated”;
“No one will defeat us with lies”;
“Brazil’s destiny is decided solely by Brazilians — without foreign interference or subservience” (Lula, 2026).
On a practical level, he launched the Sovereign Brazil Plan: 40 billion reais ($7.76 billion US dollars) earmarked to compensate exporters for their losses. He further reoriented Brazil’s relations with China, Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009 that absorbs about 25 percent of its exports and accounts for about 40 percent of its trade surplus.
Israel, Netanyahu, and Flávio Bolsonaro’s campaign
Bolsonaro promised during his 2018 election campaign to move the Brazilian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and on November 1 — already president-elect — he confirmed this on Twitter (now X). Netanyahu traveled to Rio de Janeiro to attend his inauguration, putting an end to 15 years of tense relations that hit rock bottom in 2014 when Dilma Rousseff[4] recalled Brazil’s ambassador in response to the offensive in Gaza.
The promise to relocate the embassy was not fulfilled. The far-right evangelical movement views recognizing Jerusalem as the sole capital of Israel as a divine mandate. However, Brazil is one of the largest exporters of “halal” meat — which complies with Islamic standards — and nearly half of its beef and chicken sales go to the Middle East. Agribusiness representatives in the government and the legislature estimated that recognizing Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem — including the eastern sector occupied in 1967 — would provoke trade retaliation from Arab countries and opposed the move. Bolsonaro traveled to Tel Aviv in March 2019 and announced the opening of a trade office in Jerusalem — a symbolic gesture without full diplomatic status that disappointed Zionist power circles.
In January 2026, Flávio Bolsonaro traveled to Tel Aviv in search of political and operational support. He revisited the issue with Netanyahu and promised to follow through if he wins the election. In an interview with the Jerusalem Post, he revealed that he would frame foreign policy within a framework of Judeo-Christian values and revealed the first name on his cabinet: Cláudio Lottenberg, an ophthalmologist who chairs the Brazilian Israelite Confederation, and who traveled to Israel in 2024 and met with President Isaac Herzog. Upon his return, he wrote the book Between Light and Darkness, a Zionist pamphlet in the style of a manual in which he presents the colonization of Palestine and the genocide as a conflict between civilizational models in which the light comes from Israel.
Five months later, on July 25, 2026, Netanyahu sent a video message of support for Flávio to the PL convention that officially nominated him as a presidential candidate. (The convention also featured a message of support from Javier Milei.)[5]
The backdrop to Lottenberg’s statements and book is the diplomatic rift between Brazil and Israel in 2024, when Lula compared the offensive in Gaza to the Holocaust and Netanyahu declared him persona non grata. (Brazil has not had an ambassador to Israel since then.)
The Banco Master scandal and its impact on the elections
In 2025, the Banco Master scandal erupted — the largest banking fraud in Brazil’s history — with losses potentially exceeding $2.2 billion dollars and affecting 1.6 million creditors. Banco Master’s majority partner, Daniel Vorcaro, was arrested on November 17. But the real scandal began when the dense network of contacts he had woven among deputies, senators, former governors, former ministers, and Federal Supreme Court (STF) justices came to light.
“Brother, I am and always will be with you; there’s no such thing as half a conversation between us,” Flávio wrote to Vorcaro on WhatsApp on November 16 — one day before the arrest. (The Intercept Brasil, May 13, 2026.) The message is part of a record indicating that Vorcaro promised to provide $24 million for the production of Dark Horse, a biographical film about Jair Bolsonaro starring American actor Jim Caviezel.
At least $10.6 million of the promised amount was delivered in six bank transfers between February and May 2025. Eduardo Bolsonaro, Flávio’s brother who lives in the United States, is the film’s executive producer and the recipient of the money. The Intercept Brasil confirmed that he rents a mansion in Southlake, Texas — the seventh-wealthiest community in the United States — and although an investigation is underway to determine whether he used Vorcaro’s money to cover personal expenses, the evidence suggests that several of the funds negotiated by Flávio ended up in a fund controlled by Eduardo’s inner circle, including his immigration lawyer.[6]
Vorcaro, however, pointed the finger in all directions, and among the network of officials who benefited from acting in his favor, the name of Alexandre de Moraes stood out — the STF justice who put Jair Bolsonaro behind bars and the scourge of the main coup plotters of January 8 — which is why his name is linked to Lula’s.
The investigation’s rapporteur — André Mendonça, a neo-Pentecostal pastor whom Bolsonaro appointed to the STF — did not even summon Flávio to testify. Instead, he promoted selective leaks that fueled the campaign against Lula, and on September 1, he lifted the confidentiality of the investigation only on the chapter regarding the links between Vorcaro and Moraes. The move sent the São Paulo Stock Exchange soaring by 3.4 percent, an unusual rise that reflects optimism among financial speculators. Word leaked from the Planalto Palace that the justice has Trump’s blessing.
Moraes retaliated on September 3 with a federal police report implicating Mendonça in a plot to disrupt the pre-election agenda by creating tensions within the STF, thereby fostering a climate of chaos that would benefit Flávio’s campaign.
At the same time, ICL Notícias released messages and audio recordings from Vorcaro’s cell phone revealing the meeting he held on March 14, 2025, with Mendonça to discuss his “difficulties” with the Central Bank — not at the STF headquarters but at an institute owned by the justice. The meeting was coordinated by Cezinha de Madureira, a PL congressman and vice president of the Evangelical Parliamentary Front, and attorney Ciro Rocha, who on February 8 sent Vorcaro a photo via WhatsApp showing him alongside Mendonça at a São Paulo location of the Vasco Vasconcelos tailor shop — the most exclusive in the country — along with an audio message: “Hey, Vorcarinho! Working for you. I just took André to Vasco’s to have a suit made.” (Motoryn, 2026)
At Lula’s request, STF chief justice Edson Fachin is leading an investigation into the allegations against the two judges. But as the controversy has shifted to questions about Mendonça’s conduct, on September 15 the United States threatened to apply the Magnitsky Act against two other justices, whose punitive measures include restrictions on assets subject to US jurisdiction and limitations on certain financial transactions.
Lula’s challenges ahead of October 4 and forecasts
Unity between the Brazilian left and the labor movement was built by weaving a grassroots network in factories, unions, neighborhood associations, grassroots ecclesial communities, and popular and student organizations. The strength of the PT[7] stemmed from its deep roots in that struggle; but faced with the political pressures that came after winning state power, it lost touch with the masses. Faced with the imperative to preserve political power, it became an increasingly electoral party, ever more dependent on the figure of its sole leader: Lula, who, at 81, has no successor.
The PT’s loss of connection with its roots worsened when new communication technologies changed the rules of the game. The world of work has become fragmented, workdays are increasingly long and solitary, and social protection is steadily declining. Workers’ isolation leaves them vulnerable to blackmail, and their collective experience is subverted by algorithms that dumb them down.
It is widely believed that Lula will do nothing to undermine the foundations of neoliberalism, because he views consumption as the engine of social development, and although he is capable of gauging the pulse of the people, he has not promoted a process of revolutionary transformation. And everything points to the fact that the middle class does not support him today with its usual optimism, given its current uncertainty.
The left is divided into three major groups: one sector remains uncritically loyal to Lula and expresses visceral rejection of any instance of “friendly fire”; another, more critical group is disappointed with his administration but is aware of the historic moment and will vote for him. A third group, which includes Marxist activists and the far left, expresses outrage at a government riddled with neoliberal technocrats. Some segments within its ranks brand Lula himself a “neoliberal” and a “traitor,” and declare themselves neutral heading into the election.
Lula has a track record capable of stirring deep affection. In Brazil, there is a perception that he identifies with the aspirations of the vast majority and works to address their demands. This earns him popular support, especially among lower-income sectors. However, informal employment, the precarious state of public transportation, and the distance to polling places make it particularly difficult for these people to get to the polls. Voter abstention, therefore, “…ceases to be mere statistical noise and begins to destort political representation.” (Vasconcelos, 2026)
The oligarchy controls radio stations and digital platforms and is able to manipulate informal communication channels. It has the money to buy off influencers on social media who stoke fear, hope, resentment, or a sense of belonging. Flávio also has access to US and Israeli intelligence and cybersecurity infrastructure.
Polls show a dead heat — unprecedented in Lula’s political career. The October 4 election will almost certainly not determine a winner. A runoff on October 25 is the most likely scenario. Its outcome is more uncertain than in any of Lula’s previous electoral races.
Lula retains structural advantages — the economy, his stance toward Trump, and achievements in biodiversity — but faces erosion due to public insecurity, the crisis in the Federal Supreme Court (STF), a disconnect with young voters, and disillusionment among the most radical sector of his historic base. Flávio Bolsonaro, with less charisma than his father and burdened by the Banco Master scandal, benefits from pent up opposition to the government, international backing (Trump, Netanyahu, and Milei), and a generational shift toward the right.
A victory for Lula in the runoff is likely — as narrow as the one in 2022 — supported by the anti-Bolsonaro vote that would mobilize in the runoff, but a victory for Flávio is plausible. This is, by far, the most uncertain election in Brazil since the return to democracy in the 1980s.
The Brazilian left and the Brazilian people are faced with a candidate who makes no secret of his intention to place the nation at the feet of the United States. With Flávio, the number of neo-fascist or far-right regimes in Latin America would rise to ten, the Southern Cone — except for Uruguay — would fall under Trump’s control, and the number of governments incorporated into the Shield of the Americas — an instrument of the US National Security Doctrine designed to sweep away all opposition to its designs through military force — would rise to 19 out of 33 (57.57 percent).
Can one remain neutral when what is at stake is the establishment of neo-fascism? “It is time for reckoning, and for a united march, and we must walk in tight formation, like silver in the roots of the Andes,” warned Martí[8] more than a century ago with words that resonate today. (Martí, vol. 6, 1975: 15)
Bibliography
Ámbito: “Lula da Silva pidió investigar ‘sin blindajes’ el escándalo que sacude al Supremo Tribunal Federal”, September 4, 2026.
Bellotti Azevedo, Giovanna and Rachel Gamarski: “Brasil enfrenta una creciente crisis de deuda: ocho millones de empresas están en mora”. Bloomberg (online), May 5, 2026.
Dossier: ¿Neofascismos en América Latina? Palabra Pública (Santiago de Chile), Universidad de Chile / No. 12 / November-December 2018.
Jornal Local: “Documento financeiro obtido em processo judicial aponta transação realizada em outubro de 2025 para empresa ligada à Alfaiataria Vasco Vasconcellos, meses depois de advogado de Daniel Vorcaro levar o ministro André Mendonça ao estabelecimento; relação ent”, September 4, 2026.
Lula da Silva, Luiz Inacio: “US tariffs on Brazil are a strategic mistake”. The Washington Post (online), July 26, 2026.
Mafei, Rafael: “As urnas no ritmo da justiça”. Piauí, September 2, 2026.
Martí Pérez, José: Obras Completas. Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Havana, 1975.
Martins, Laís, Eduardo Goulart, Leandro Becker and Paulo Motoryn: “Vaza Flávio. Parte 5”. The Intercept Brasil (online), May 15, 2026. Available:
Motoryn, Paulo, Eduardo Goulart, Laís Martins, Andrew Fishman, Cecília Olliveira, Leandro Becker and Mauricio Moraes: “Vaza Flávio. Parte 1”. The Intercept Brasil (online), May 13, 2026.
Motoryn, Paulo: “Vaza Mendonça: mensagens e áudios inéditos revelam encontro secreto de Vorcaro e André Mendonça”, ICL Notícias, September 3, 2026.
Nogueira Batista Jr., Paulo: “Eleições de 2026 – o Brasil à beira do precipício outra vez”, Brasil de Fato (São Paulo), September 4, 2026.
Pignotti, Darío: “Embestida judicial contra Lula”. Página 12, September 5, 2026. Available:
Reis, Ian, José Eduardo Bernardes and Larissa Bohrer: “Avanços sociais marcam dois primeiros anos do governo Lula 3, com expectativa de melhora até 2026, aponta pesquisador”. Brasil de Fato (São Paulo), August 22, 2025. Available:
Rodríguez Pinzón, Érika and Pablo Stefanoni (eds.): América Latina en el cruce de caminos: apuestas ideológicas, cambios culturales y reconfiguraciones globales. Informe anual 2025-2026. Madrid, Fundación Carolina, January 2026.
Souza, Jair de: “Entre a conciliação e a Revolução”. Brasil 247, February 6, 2025.
VASCONCELOS, EDUARDO: “A eleição de 2026 será decidida muito além da urna”. Congresso em Foco (online), Sunday, September 6, 2026.
NOTES
[1] Supporters of former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro stormed Congress and other buildings in the capital of Brasília on January 8, 2023, calling for the military to take over the country’s government. By evening, security forces had retaken control and several hundred had been arrested. Many Bolsonaro supporters refused to accept the far-right former leader’s electoral defeat and the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
[2] Jair Bolsonaro was charged, along with seven others, with plotting a coup against the Lula government, attempting to overthrow Brazil’s democratic order, and participating in an armed criminal group. He was also found guilty of charges relating to the riots in Brasília on January 8, 2023.
[3] Tarcísio de Freitas is an engineer and former military officer who has served as governor of São Paulo.
[4] Dilma Rousseff is an economist and politician who served as Brazil’s president from 2011 until her impeachment and removal from office in August 2016. Since March 2023, she has been the chair of the New Development Bank.
[5] Javier Gerardo Milei is an ultra-rightist, who is an economist and has been Argentina’s president since 2023.
[6] In June 2026, Eduardo Bolsonaro was sentenced by Brazil’s Federal Supreme Court to four years and two months in prison for coercion during judicial proceedings. According to the court, while in the United States, he attempted to interfere with the trial in which his father was convicted over an attempted coup. Bolsonaro arrived in the United States in early 2025 and was granted residency on July 20, 2026.
[7] The PT is the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) and the party of the country’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
[8] José Martí, born in Havana in 1853, was a poet, essayist, and leader of the movement for Cuban independence from Spain. He died in battle in 1895. His patriotism and martyrdom made his name a symbol for liberty throughout Latin America. He is considered Cuba’s national hero.
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